Animals as Moral Agents

In the realm of ethology, the study of animal behavior, a groundbreaking perspective is gaining traction: the notion that non-human animals can be moral agents. Jordi Casamitjana, a renowned ethologist, delves into this provocative idea, challenging the long-held belief that morality is an exclusively human trait. Through meticulous observation and scientific inquiry, Casamitjana and other forward-thinking scientists argue that many animals possess the capacity to discern right from wrong, thereby qualifying as moral agents. This article explores the evidence supporting this claim, examining the behaviors and social interactions of various species that suggest a complex understanding of morality. From the playful fairness observed in canids to altruistic acts in primates and empathy in elephants, the animal kingdom reveals a tapestry of moral behaviors that compel us to reconsider our anthropocentric views. As we unravel these findings, we are invited to reflect on the ethical implications for how we interact with and perceive the non-human inhabitants of our planet.
**Introduction: “Animals Can Be‍ Moral‍ Agents Too”**

In the realm of ethology, the study of animal behavior, a groundbreaking perspective⁤ is gaining traction: the⁢ notion that non-human animals can be moral agents. Jordi Casamitjana, ⁢a renowned ethologist, ⁣delves into ‌this provocative idea, challenging the long-held belief that morality ​is an exclusively human trait. Through⁤ meticulous observation and scientific inquiry, Casamitjana and other forward-thinking scientists argue‌ that many animals possess the capacity to discern right from wrong, thereby qualifying as moral agents. This article explores the evidence supporting this claim, examining the behaviors and social interactions of various species that suggest a complex understanding of morality. From the⁣ playful fairness observed in canids to altruistic acts in primates and empathy in elephants, the animal kingdom reveals a tapestry​ of moral behaviors‍ that compel us to reconsider our anthropocentric views. As we​ unravel these findings, we are invited⁢ to reflect on the ethical implications for how we interact with ‌and perceive the non-human inhabitants of our planet.

The Ethologist Jordi Casamitjana looks at how non-human animals could be described as moral agents, as many are capable of knowing the difference between right and wrong

It has happened every time.

When someone emphatically says that they have identified a trait that is absolutely unique to the human species, sooner or later someone else will find some evidence of such trait in other animals, albeit perhaps in a different form or degree. Supremacist humans often justify their misguided view of human beings being the “superior” species by using some positive character traits, some mental faculties, or some behavioural peculiarities they believe are unique to our species. However, give it sufficient time, evidence that these are not unique to us but can also be found in some other animals will most likely emerge.

I am not talking about particular unique configurations of genes or skills each individual has as no individual is identical (not even twins), and neither their lives will be. Although the uniqueness of individuals is also shared with all other species, these will not define the whole species, but they will be an expression of normal variability. I am talking about distinctive traits that are considered “defining” of our species for being typical, commonly found among all of us, and apparently absent in other animals, which can be conceptualised more abstractly so as not to make them culture, population, or individual dependant.

For instance, the capacity to communicate with spoken language, the ability to cultivate food, the skill to use tools to manipulate the world, etc. All of these traits were once used to place “humanity” in a separate “superior” category above all the other creatures, but later were found in other animals, so they stopped being useful to human supremacists. We know that many animals communicate with each other by voice and do have language that sometimes varies from population to population creating “dialects”, similar to what happens with human language (like in the cases of other primates and many songbirds). We also know that some ants, termites and beetles cultivate fungi in a very similar way humans cultivate crops. And since Dr Jane Goodall discovered how chimpanzees used modified sticks to get insects, tool use has been found in many other species (orangutans, crows, dolphins, bowerbirds, elephants, otters, octopuses, etc.).

There is one of these “superpowers ” that most people still believe is uniquely human: the ability to be moral agents who understand right and wrong and therefore can be made accountable for their actions. Well, like in all the others, considering this trait unique to us turned out to be yet another arrogant premature presumption. Although still not accepted by mainstream science, there is an increasing number of scientists (including me) who now believe non-human animals can also be moral agents, because we have already found enough evidence that suggests so.

Ethics and Morals

Animals as Moral Agents July 2024

The words ethical and moral are often used as synonymous, but they are not quite the same concept. What makes them different is crucial for this article, as I claim that non-human animals can also be moral agents, but not necessarily ethical agents. So, it would be good to spend some time defining these concepts first.

Both concepts deal with the ideas of “right” and “wrong” (and the most relative equivalent “fair” and “unfair”), and with rules that govern an individual’s behaviour based on such ideas, but the difference lies in whose rules are we talking about. Ethics refer to rules of conduct in a particular group recognised by an external source or social system, while morals refer to principles or rules relating to right or wrong conduct based on an individual or group’s own compass of right and wrong. In other words, each group (or even individuals) can create their own moral rules, and those in the group who follow them are behaving “rightly”, while those who break them are behaving “wrongly”. On the other side, individuals or groups who govern their behaviour by rules created externally which claim to be more universal and not dependant on particular groups or individuals, they follow ethical rules. Looking at the extremes of both concepts, on one side we can find a moral code that only applies to one individual (that individual has created personal rules of conduct and follows them without necessarily sharing them with anyone else), and on the other extreme a philosopher may be trying to draft an ethical code based on universal principles drawn from all religions, ideologies, and cultures, claiming that this code applies to all human beings (Ethical principles may be discovered by philosophers rather than created because some may be natural and truly universal).

As a hypothetical example of morality, a group of Japanese students sharing accommodation may create their own rules about how to live together (such as who cleans what, at what time they should stop playing music, who pays the bills and the rent, etc.), and these will constitute the morality of that apartment. The students are expected to follow the rules (do right), and if they break them (do wrong) there should be negative consequences for them.

Conversely, as a hypothetical example of ethics, the same group of Japanese students may all be Christians who follow the Catholic Church, so when they do something against Catholic doctrine they are breaking their religious ethics. The Catholic Church claims that its rules of right and wrong are universal and apply to all human beings, regardless if they are Catholics or not, and this is why their doctrine is based on ethics, not morality. However, the students’ moral code (the apartment rules that they have agreed to) may well be very much based on the ethical code of the Catholic Church, so a transgression of a particular rule may be both a transgression of an ethical code and a moral code (and this is why often both terms are used as synonymous).

To confuse the situation even further, the term “Ethics” in itself is often used to label the branch of philosophy that studies fairness and rightness in human reasoning and behaviour, and therefore issues related to both moral and ethical codes. Philosophers tend to follow one of three different schools of ethics. On one side, “deontological ethics” determines rightness from both the acts and the rules or duties the person doing the act is trying to fulfil, and in consequence, identifies actions as intrinsically good or bad. One of the more influential animal-rights philosophers advocating this approach was the American Tom Regan, who argued animals possess value as “subjects-of-a-life” because they have beliefs, desires, memory and the ability to initiate action in pursuit of goals. Then we have “utilitarian ethics”, which believes the proper course of action is the one that maximises a positive effect. A utilitarian can suddenly switch behaviour if the numbers no longer support it. They could also “sacrifice” a minority for the benefit of the majority. The most influential animal-rights utilitarian is the Australian Peter Singer, who argues the principle “the greatest good of the greatest number’ should be applied to other animals, as the boundary between human and “animal” is arbitrary. Finally, the third school is the school of “virtue-based ethics”, which draws on the work of Aristotle who stated that the virtues (such as justice, charity, and generosity) predispose both the person possessing them and that person’s society on the way they act.

Therefore, people’s behaviour may be governed by their own private morals, the morals of the community they live with, one of the three schools of ethics (or several of them each applied in different circumstances), and specific ethical codes of religions or ideologies. Particular rules about some specific behaviour may be the same in all these moral and ethical codes, but some may conflict with each other (and the individual may have a moral rule about how to deal with such conflicts.

As an example, let’s look at my current philosophical and behavioural choices. I apply deontological ethics for negative actions (there are harmful things I would never do because I consider them intrinsically wrong) but utilitarian ethics in positive actions (I try to help those who need more help first and choose the behaviour that benefits the most individuals). I am not religious, but I am an ethical vegan, so I follow the ethics of the philosophy of veganism (I consider the main axioms of veganism to be universal principles that should be followed by all decent humans). I live by myself, so I do not have to subscribe to any “apartment” rules, but I live in London and I abide by the morality of a good Londoner following the written and unwritten rules of its citizens (such as standing on the right in the escalators). As a zoologist, I also abide by the professional code of conduct of the morality of the scientific community.  I use the official definition of veganism of the Vegan Society as my moral baseline, but my morality pushes me to go beyond it and apply it in a wider sense than is strictly defined (for instance, in addition to trying not to harm sentient beings as veganism dictates, I also try to avoid harming any living being, sentient or not). This made me try to avoid killing any plant unnecessarily (even if I am not always successful).  I also have a personal moral rule that made me try to avoid using buses in Spring and Summer if I have a feasible public transport alternative as I want to avoid being in a vehicle that has accidentally killed a flying insect). Therefore, my behaviour is governed by a series of ethical and moral codes, with some of their rules shared with others while others are not, but if I break any of them I consider that I have done “wrong” (regardless of whether I have been “caught” or I am punished for it).

Moral Agency on Non-Human Animals

Animals as Moral Agents July 2024
Marc Bekoff and minnie (c) Marc Bekoff

One of the scientists who has advocated for the recognition of some non-human animals as moral beings is the American ethologist Marc Bekoff, whom I had the privilege to interview recently. He studied social playing behaviour in canids (such as coyotes, wolves, foxes and dogs) and by watching how the animals interacted with each other during play, he concluded that they had moral codes that sometimes they follow, sometimes they break, and when they brake them there would be negative consequences that allow individuals to learn the social morality of the group. In other words, within each society of animals who play, the individuals learn the rules and through a sense of fairness learn what behaviour is right and what is wrong. In his influential book “The Emotional Lives of Animals” (a new edition of which has just been published), he wrote:

“In its most basic form, morality can be thought of as a “prosocial” behaviour — behaviour aimed at promoting (or at least not diminishing) the welfare of others. Morality is essentially a social phenomenon: it arises in the interactions between and among individuals, and it exists as a kind of webbing or fabric that holds together a complicated tapestry of social relationships. The word morality has since become shorthand for knowing the difference between right and wrong, between being good and being bad.”

Bekoff and others found that non-human animals show fairness during play, and they react negatively to unfair behaviour. An animal who broke the rules of play (such as biting too hard or not dialling down the vigour of their physical actions when playing with someone much younger — which is called self-handicapping) would be regarded by others in the group as having done wrong, and either be told off or not treated favourably during other social interactions. The animal who did wrong can correct the error by asking for forgiveness, and this may work. In canids, an “apology” during play will take the form of specific gestures such as the “play bow”, composed by a topline angled down toward the head, the tail held horizontal to vertical, but not below the topline, relaxed body and face, ears held mid skull or forward, forelimbs touching the ground from paw to elbow, and tail wagging. The play bow is also the body posture that signals “I want to play”, and anyone watching dogs in a park can recognise it.

Bekoff writes, “Dogs don’t tolerate noncooperative cheaters, who may be avoided or chased from play groups. When a dog’s sense of fairness is violated, there are consequences.” When he studied coyotes, Bekoff found that coyote pups who don’t play as much as others because they are avoided by others are more likely to leave the group, which has a cost as this increases the chances of dying. In a study he did with coyotes in the Grand Teton National Park in Wyoming he found that 55% of yearlings who drifted away from their group died, whereas fewer than 20% of those who stayed with the group did.

Therefore, through learning from playing and other social interactions, animals assign the labels of “right” and “wrong” to each of their behaviours and learn the morality of the group (which may be a different morality from another group or species).

Moral agents are normally defined as persons who have the ability to discern right from wrong and to be held accountable for their own actions. I normally use the term “person” as a being with a distinctive personality that has an internal and external identity, so for me, this definition would equally apply to non-sentient beings. Once animals have learnt which behaviours are considered right and wrong in the societies they live in, they can choose how to behave based on such knowledge, becoming moral agents. It may be that they acquired some of such knowledge instinctively from their genes, but if they did it by learning through play or social interactions, once they reach adulthood and know the difference between behaving rightly and behaving wrongly, they have become moral agents accountable for their actions (as long as they are mentally sound within the normal parameters of their biology, as is often the case of humans in trials who can only be found guilty of crimes if they are mentally competent adults).

However, as we will see later, breaking a moral code only makes you accountable to the group that holds that code, not other groups with different codes you have not subscribed to (in human terms, something that is illegal—or even immoral—in a country or culture may be permissible in another).

Some people may argue that non-human animals cannot be moral agents because they have no choice as all their behaviour is instinctive, but this is a very old-fashioned view. There is consensus now among Ethologists that, at least in mammals and birds, most behaviours come from a combination of instincts and learning, and the black-and-white dichotomy of nature vs nurture does not hold water anymore. Genes may predispose to some behaviours, but the effects of the environment in development, and learning through life, can modulate them to their final form (which may vary depending on external circumstances). That applies to humans too, so if we accept that humans, with all their genes and instincts, can be moral agents, there is no reason to believe moral agency could not be found in other animals with very similar genes and instincts (especially other social primates like us). Supremacists would like us to apply different ethological standards for humans, but the truth is that there are no qualitative differences in the development of our behavioural repertoire that would justify that. If we accept humans can be moral agents and are not deterministic machines not responsible for their actions, we cannot deny the same attribute to other social animals capable of learning and modulating behaviour with experience.

Evidence of Moral Behaviour in Non-Human Animals

Animals as Moral Agents July 2024

To find evidence of morality in non-human animals, we only need to find evidence of social species whose individuals recognise each other and play. There are plenty that do. There are thousands of social species on the planet, and most mammals, even those from solitary species, play with their siblings when young, but although all of this will use play to train their bodies for the behaviours they need to perfection in adulthood, social mammals and birds will also use play to learn about who is who in their society, and what are the moral rules of their group. For instance, rules such as don’t steal food from someone above you in the hierarchy, don’t play too rough with babies, groom others to make peace, don’t play with someone who does not want to play, don’t mess with someone’s baby without permission, share food with your offspring, defend your friends, etc. If we were to deduce more elevated concepts from these rules (as anthropologists often do when looking a morality in human groups), we would use terms such as honesty, friendship, temperance, politeness, generosity, or respect — which would be virtues we attribute to moral beings.

Some studies have found that non-human animals are sometimes willing to help others at their own cost (which is called altruism), either because they have learnt this is the right behaviour expected of them by members of their group, or because their personal morality (learnt or innate, conscious or unconscious) directed them to behave that way. Altruistic behaviour of this type has been shown by pigeons (Watanabe and Ono 1986), rats (Church 1959; Rice and Gainer 1962; Evans and Braud 1969; Greene 1969; Bartal et al. 2011; Sato et al. 2015), and several primates (Masserman et al. 1964; Wechkin et al. 1964; Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Burkart et al. 2007; Warneken et al. 2007; Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Cronin et al. 2010; Horner et al. 2011; Schmelz et al. 2017).

Evidence of empathy and caring for others in distress has also been found in corvids (Seed et al. 2007; Fraser and Bugnyar 2010), primates (de Waal and van Roosmalen 1979; Kutsukake and Castles 2004; Cordoni et al. 2006; Fraser et al. 2008; Clay and de Waal 2013; Palagi et al. 2014), canines (Cools et al. 2008; Palagi and Cordoni 2009; Custance and Mayer 2012), elephants (Plotnik and de Waal 2014), budgerigars (Ikkatai et al. 2016), horses (Cozzi et al. 2010), and prairie voles (Burkett et al. 2016).

Inequity aversion (IA), the preference for fairness and resistance to incidental inequalities, has also been found in chimpanzees (Brosnan et al. 2005, 2010), monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal 2003; Cronin and Snowdon 2008; Massen et al. 2012), dogs (Range et al. 2008), and rats (Oberliessen et al. 2016).

If humans do not see morality in other species even when the evidence they have for it is similar to the evidence we accept when looking at humans’ behaviour from different groups, this only shows humanity’s prejudices, or an effort to suppress moral behaviour in others. Susana Monsó, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, and Annika Bremhorst, authors of the 2018 paper “Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters”, who compiled all these references above, concluded, “We have found many contexts, including routine procedures in farms, labs, and in our homes, where humans potentially interfere with, hinder, or destroy the moral capabilities of animals.”

There are even some individual animals who have been seen spontaneously playing with members of other species (other than humans), which is called Intraspecific Social Play (ISP). It has been reported in primates, cetaceans, carnivores, reptiles, and birds. This means that the morality that some of these animals follow may cross over with other species — perhaps leaning into more mammalian or vertebrate ethical rules. These days, with the advent of social media, we can find plenty of videos showing animals of different species playing with each other — and seemingly understanding the rules of their games — or even helping each other in what appears to be a completely selfless way — doing what we should describe as good deeds characteristic of moral beings.

Every day there is more and more evidence against the notion of humans being the only moral beings on planet Earth.

Implications for the Wild Animal Suffering Debate

Animals as Moral Agents July 2024

Mark Rowlands, author of the internationally bestselling memoir The Philosopher and the Wolf, argued that some non-human animals may be moral creatures who can behave based on moral motivations. He stated that moral emotions such as “sympathy and compassion, kindness, tolerance, and patience, and also their negative counterparts such as anger, indignation, malice, and spite”, as well as “a sense of what is fair and what is not”, can be found in non-human animals. However, he has said that, while animals probably lack the sorts of concepts and metacognitive capacities necessary to be held morally responsible for their behaviour, this only excludes them from the possibility of counting as moral agents. I agree with his views except on this later assertion because I believe that moral beings are moral agents too (as I argued earlier).

I suspect Rowlands said some non-human animals can be moral beings but not moral agents because of the influence of the wild animal suffering debate. This is centred on whether people who care about the suffering of others should try to reduce animal suffering in the wild by intervening in predator/prey interactions, and other forms of suffering caused by other non-human animals. Many vegans, like myself, advocate for leaving Nature alone and not only focusing on preventing humans from messing up the lives of exploited animals but even relinquishing some of the land we stole and returning it to Nature (I wrote an article about this titled The Vegan Case for Rewilding).

However, a minority of vegans disagree with this and, appealing to the Nature fallacy, say that wild animal suffering inflicted by other wild animals matters too and we should intervene to reduce it (perhaps stopping predators from killing prey, or even reducing the size of natural ecosystems to reduce the amount of suffering of the animals in them). “Predation eliminationists” do exist. Some members  — not all —  of the recently labelled “Wild Animal Suffering Movement” (in which organisations such as Animal Ethics and Wild Animal Initiative play an important role) have been advocating this view.

One of the most common replies from the mainstream vegan community to such unusual — and extreme — views is saying that wild animals are not moral agents so predators are not to blame for killing prey, as they do not know that killing other sentient beings may be wrong. It is not surprising, then, that when these vegans see others like me saying that non-human animals are moral agents too (including wild predators) they get nervous and would prefer this is not true.

However, there is no reason to be nervous. We claim that non-human animals are moral agents, not ethical agents, and that, considering what we have discussed earlier about the difference between these two concepts, is what allows us to still be able to simultaneously hold the view that we should not intervene in Nature and that many wild animals are moral agents. The key point is that moral agents only do wrong when they transgress one of their moral codes, but they are not accountable to humans, but only to those who “sign” the moral code with them. A wolf who has done something wrong is only accountable to the wolf community, not the elephant community, the bee community, or the human community. If that wolf has killed a lamb a human shepherd claims to own, the shepherd may feel that the wolf has done something wrong,  but the wolf has done nothing wrong as he did not break the wolf’s moral code.

It is precisely the acceptance that non-human animals can be moral agents that reinforces even more the attitude of leaving Nature alone. If we look at other animal species as “nations” it is easier to understand. In the same way, we should not be intervening in other human nations’ laws and policies (for instance, ethical veganism is legally protected in the UK but not in the US yet, but this does not mean Britain should invade the US to correct this problem) we should not be intervening in other animal nations’ moral codes. Our intervention in Nature should be limited to repairing the damage we caused and  “pulling out” from the truly natural ecosystems that are self-sustained because it is likely that in these there is less net suffering than any human-made habitat (or natural habitat which we have messed with to the point it’s no longer ecologically balanced).

Leaving Nature alone does not mean ignoring the suffering of wild animals we meet, as this would be speciesist. Wild animals matter as much as domesticated animals. I am in favour of rescuing stranded animals we encounter, healing injured wildlife that can be rehabilitated back into the wild, or putting out of its misery an agonising wild animal who cannot be saved. In my book Ethical Vegan and in the article I mentioned, I describe the “ordeal involvement approach” I use to decide when to intervene. Leaving nature alone means recognizing both Nature’s sovereignty and human fallibility, and seeing hands-off ecosystem-focus  “anti-speciesist rewilding” as an acceptable intervention.

Moral agency in cats and dogs may be another story because many of those who are companion animals have kind of “signed” a contract with their human companions, so they share the same moral code. The process of “training” cats and dogs could be seen as the “negotiations” for such a contract (as long as it is not aversive and there is consent), and many cats of dogs are happy with the terms as long as they are fed and given shelter. If they break any of the rules, their human companions will let them know in a variety of ways (and anyone who lives with dogs has seen the “guilty face” they often show you when they know they have done something wrong). However, an exotic bird kept captive in a cage as a pet did not sign that contract, so any damage made in an attempt to escape should not lead to any punishment (those humans keeping them captive are the ones in the wrong here).

Non-Human Animals as Ethical Agents?

Animals as Moral Agents July 2024

Saying that non-human animals can be moral agents does not mean that all species can, or that all individuals of those which can, will be “good” animals. This is not about angelising non-human animalhood, but levelling the other animals up and removing us from our false pedestal. Like in humans, individual non-human animals can be good or bad, saints or sinners, angels or demons, and like with humans, being in the wrong company in the wrong environment can corrupt them too (think about dogfighting).

To be honest, I am more certain that humans are not the only moral agents on planet Earth than I am that all human beings are moral agents. Most humans have not sat down to write their moral rules or take time to consider which moral and ethical codes they want to subscribe to. They tend to follow the ethics others tell them to follow, be their parents or the dominant ideologues of their region. I would consider a non-human animal who has chosen to be good to be more ethical than one of such humans who just follow blindly the religion assigned to them by geographical lottery.

Let’s look at Jethro, for instance. He was one of the dog companions of Marc Bekoff. Vegans who feed plant-based food to their companion animals often say such companions are vegan, but this may not be true as veganism is not just a diet, but a philosophy one has to choose to hold. However, I think Jethro might have been a genuine vegan dog. In his books, Marc tells the stories about Jethro not only not killing other animals (like wild rabbits or birds) when encountering them in the wildness of Colorado where he lives, but actually saving them when in trouble and bringing them to Marc so he could help them too. Marc writes, “Jethro loved other animals, and he saved two from death. He could easily have eaten each with little effort. But you don’t do that to friends.”  I presume that Marc fed plant-based food to Jethro (as he is vegan and aware of current research on this) which means that Jethro may actually have been a vegan dog because, in addition to not consuming animal products, he had his personal morality that prevented him from harming other animals. As the moral agent he was, he chose not to harm others, and as a vegan is someone who has chosen the philosophy of veganism based on the principle of not harming others (not just someone who eats vegan food), he may have been more vegan than a teenager influencer who just eats plant-based food and takes selfies while he is doing it.

Animal rights vegans like myself not only hold the philosophy of veganism, but also the philosophy of animal rights (which overlap greatly, but I think they are still separate). As such, we have been saying that non-human animals have moral rights, and we fight to transform such rights into legal rights that prevent people from exploiting them and allow individual non-human animals to be treated as legal persons who cannot be killed, harmed, or deprived of liberty. But when we use the term “moral rights” in this context, we normally mean moral rights within human societies.

I think we should go further and proclaim that non-human animals are moral agents with their own moral rights, and interfering with such rights is an infringement of ethical principles we humans should follow. It is not up to us to give non-human animals their rights because they already have them and live by them. They already had them before humans evolved into being. It is up to us to change our own rights and ensure that humans who infringe on the rights of others are stopped and punished. Infringing the fundamental rights of others is a breach of the ethical principles humanity has signed for, and this should apply to all humans, anywhere in the world, who have signed up to be part of humanity (with all the perks such membership entitles).

Supremacy is a carnist axiom I stopped buying into when I became vegan over 20 years ago. Since then, I stopped believing those who claim they have found a “virtue” only humans possess. I am sure that non-human animals are moral agents within their own morality that has nothing to do with ours as it was already established before we came along. But I am wondering if they can also be ethical beings who are ethical agents, and follow universal principles of right and wrong only recently human philosophers started identifying.

There is not much evidence of it yet, but I think it may well come if we pay more attention to how non-human animals behave with other species. Perhaps Ethologists should be studying Intraspecific Social Play more, and Philosophers should be looking at the commonalities of extra-human moralities to see if something emerges. I would not be surprised if it did.

It has happened every time we open our minds to accept our ordinary nature.

Notice: This content was initially published on and may not necessarily reflect the views of the Humane Foundation.

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